OPINION

  Opinion

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

RILEY, J.

In this case, we are required to construe various aspects of the nuisance abatement statute, MCL 600.3801; MSA 27A.3801. ¹ Specifically, we must decide whether an act of prostitution was consummated absent proof that money was exchanged. Next, we must determine whether the trial court erred in abating a vehicle used to commit an act of prostitution in a neighborhood with a reputation for illicit activity. Finally, we must consider whether a co-owner's interest in a vehicle may be abated where the co-owner allegedly had no knowledge that the vehicle was used in proscription of the statute.

 

1 Any building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or place used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation or prostitution or gambling, or used by, or kept for the use of prostitutes or other disorderly persons, or used for the unlawful manufacture, transporting, sale, keeping for sale, bartering, or furnishing of any controlled substance as defined in section 7104 of the public health code, Act No. 368 of the Public Acts of 1978, being section 333.7104 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, or of any vinous, malt, brewed, fermented, spirituous, or intoxicating liquors or any mixed liquors or beverages, any part of which is intoxicating, is declared a nuisance, and the furniture, fixtures, and contents of the building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or place and all intoxicating liquors therein are also declared a nuisance, and all controlled substances and nuisances shall be enjoined and abated as provided in this act and as provided in the court rules. Any person or his or her servant, agent, or employee who owns, leases, conducts, or maintains any building, vehicle, or place used for any of the purposes or acts set forth in this section is guilty of a nuisance.

  We would hold that lewdness, incidental to an act of prostitution, is activity squarely within the purview of the nuisance abatement statute. Alternatively, we conclude that proof of an exchange of money is not necessary where, as here, it is clear from the totality of circumstances that the sexual act was in exchange for payment. Additionally, we would uphold the abatement of this vehicle because the defendant entered a neighborhood that is a known place for prostitution and used his vehicle to engage in illicit activity, thereby contributing to the existing nuisance. Finally, pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of the statute, we would hold that knowledge or consent is not required to abate the interest of a co-owner.

John Bennis was arrested for gross indecency on the evening of October 3, 1988. On that evening, Detroit police officers Jacob Anthony and John Howe set up surveillance after they witnessed a woman "flagging" ² passing vehicles on the corner of Eight Mile and Sheffield. The woman was later identified as Kathy Polarchio. The officers next observed a 1977 Pontiac, driven by a man, later identified as John Bennis, turn onto Sheffield and stop near Ms. Polarchio, who approached and entered the passenger side of the Pontiac. The officers followed the Bennis vehicle, which proceeded a block, made a U-turn, and stopped. Surveillance continued until the officers noticed Mr. Polarchio's head disappear toward the driver's side of the Pontiac. The officers immediately approached the Bennis vehicle, shined a flashlight into the front seat, and witnessed Ms. Polarchio performing an act of fellatio on Mr. Bennis.

 

2 "Flagging" is the manner in which prostitutes solicit business from potential customers in passing vehicles.

Mr. Bennis was convicted of gross indecency in violation of MCL 750.338b; MSA 28.570(2). ³ The Wayne County prosecutor then filed a complaint alleging that the Bennis vehicle was a public nuisance subject to abatement pursuant to MCL 600.3801; MSA 27A.3801. The vehicle was co-owned by Mr. Bennis' wife, Tina Bennis, who claimed that she had no knowledge that her husband ever used their vehicle in violation of the statute. The trial judge held that the vehicle was a nuisance and abated the interest of defendant and his wife.

 

3 Ms. Polarchio was arrested the next day for accosting and soliciting. She had formerly been arrested on several occasions for disorderly conduct, accosting and soliciting, and indecent and obscene conduct.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, ⁴ holding first that the prosecution had an obligation under People v Schoonmaker, 241 Mich 177; 216 NW 456 (1927), to demonstrate that Mr. Bennis' wife knew that he used the vehicle in a manner proscribed by the statute and failed to offer such proof. ⁵ The Court of Appeals next held that under State ex rel Oakland Co Prosecutor v Motorama Motel Corp, 105 Mich. App. 224; 307 N.W.2d 349 (1981), proof of a single incident of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution is insufficient to establish a nuisance. Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that an act of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution occurred.

 

4 200 Mich. App. 670; 504 N.W.2d 731 (1993).

5 Schoonmaker was based on a predecessor statute, 1925 PA 389; however, the relevant language is virtually identical to the present statute. See n 24.

We granted leave to appeal ⁶ and now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

 

6 445 Mich 861 (1994).

II

We turn first to whether the act committed in the Bennis vehicle is within the purview of the nuisance abatement statute. Consistent with the 1909 Iowa "red light abatement acts," upon which the Michigan statute is based, ⁷ the Michigan statute requires that the act be one of "lewdness, assignation or prostitution." ⁸ In State ex rel Wayne Co Prosecuting Attorney v Levenburg, 406 Mich 455; 280 N.W.2d 810 (1979), this Court used the rule of construction, noscitur a sociis, to define assignation in the statute. ⁹ The Court upheld the abatement of a bar because it was used for accosting and soliciting acts of prostitution. In other words, "the making of an appointment for the purpose of prostitution" constituted assignation under the statute. Id. at 466. Levenburg based its decision on State ex rel Wayne Co Prosecutor v Diversified Theatrical Corp, 396 Mich 244, 246-250; 240 N.W.2d 460 (1976). Diversified essentially held that while lewdness, assignation, and prostitution are set forth in the alternative, the conduct constituting lewdness or assignation must be incidental to or in furtherance of an act of prostitution. ¹⁰

 

7 State ex rel Wayne Co Prosecutor v Diversified Theatrical Corp, 396 Mich 244, 246; 240 N.W.2d 460 (1976).

8 See n 1 (emphasis added).

9 The doctrine should be applied where legislative intent is not clear, so that "when two or more words are grouped together, and ordinarily have a similar meaning, but are not equally comprehensive, the general word will be limited and qualified by the special word." 2A Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (5th ed), § 47.16, p 183. See also Williams & Works, Inc v Springfield Corp, 408 Mich 732, 746; 293 N.W.2d 304 (1980).

 

10 Diversified relied on State v Morley, 63 NM 267, 270-271; 317 P.2d 317 (1957), which stated "we are led to believe that the legislature intended 'lewdness' to be limited to acts in connection with 'assignation' or 'prostitution'" and further noted that "the term 'lewdness' is a broader and more general term than 'assignation' or 'prostitution.'" See also State ex rel Oakland Prosecuting Attorney v Ginell, 159 Mich. App. 679, 681; 407 N.W.2d 59 (1987), in which the Court of Appeals held that the activity must not be consensual in nature, whether lewd, obscene, or disorderly;State ex rel Wayne Co Prosecuting Attorney v Dizzy Duck, 203 Mich. App. 250, 260; 511 N.W.2d 907 (1994), where the Court of Appeals concluded that lewdness "as used in the nuisance abatement statute, refers to those sexual acts . . . performed on another where done for hire."

In the instant case, the prosecution maintains that an act of lewdness, within the context of the nuisance abatement statute, occurred. Although this aspect of the statute has yet to be defined, ¹¹ we agree with the contention put forth by the prosecution.

 

11 In Diversified, we did not define lewdness, but simply held that no interest was abatable because the conduct was unrelated to live acts of prostitution on the premises.

We analogize the definition of "assignation" in Levenburg with the definition we now give to "lewdness." Levenburg looked to the common meaning of "assignation" and concluded that the common definition of the term is limited to those instances in which the act of assignation is "for the purpose of prostitution." Id. at 466. In this manner, the common definition of "lewdness" includes a lustful and obscene display of illicit sexual activity. ¹² Utilizing the common meaning of "lewdness," ¹³ we also conclude that it is limited to those instances in which an act of lewdness occurs in furtherance of or for the purpose of prostitution.

 

12 See also 50 Am Jur 2d, Lewdness, Indecency, Etc, § 1, pp 450-451:

 

   Lewdness has been defined as the unlawful indulgence of lust. It signifies that form of immorality which has relation to sexual impurity, and is generally used to indicate gross indecency with respect to the sexual relations. Illicit intercourse may under some circumstances constitute lewdness, but there may also be lewdness without any such act.

 

 

 

13 The Random House College Dictionary of the English Language: Unabridged Edition defines "lewd" as:

 

   1. inclined to, characterized by, or inciting to lust or lechery; lascivious. 2. obscene or indecent, as language or songs; salacious. 3. Obs. a. low, ignorant, or vulgar. b. base, vile, or wicked, esp. of a person. c. bad, worthless or poor, esp. of a thing.

 

 

This result is consistent with Michigan decisions in Diversified and Levenburg, supra, as well as other jurisdictions interpreting similar language. ¹⁴ For example, in Pennsylvania v MacDonald, 464 Pa 435, 460-461; 347 A.2d 290 (1975), the court addressed the issue of lewdness and concluded:

 

   

 

Far more important than mere dictionary definitions is the statutory context in which the word "lewdness" appears. . . . That context proscribes use of any building "for the purpose of fornication, . . . assignation, and/or prostitution." All of these forbidden purposes involve illicit sexual conduct, thus strongly indicating a legislative intention to proscribe only purposes of this type when it used the word "lewdness." Such a construction has the further advantage of obviating any problems of vagueness which might be entailed by construing the term "lewdness" in a broader fashion. [Emphasis supplied.]

 

 

In the case at bar, Mr. Bennis' conduct constitutes lewdness because it occurred in a residential neighborhood and was in furtherance of an act that traditionally forms the basis of a prostitution charge, i.e., fellatio. ¹⁵ This result is consistent with the definition of assignation in Levenburg, supra at 466. Indeed, we find particularly persuasive the fact that Mr. Bennis engaged in this act with a known prostitute in an area reputed for illicit activity. ¹⁶ Therefore, while no money was exchanged, the conduct clearly satisfies statutory requirements and is subject to abatement.

 

14 See Levenburg and Diversified and cases cited therein.

15 We do not decide whether property may be abated for an act of lewdness where the conduct is not that which traditionally forms a charge of prostitution.

 

16 The record is devoid of any evidence that Mr. Bennis raised in his defense that this activity was consensual or that he and Ms. Polarchio had some prior relationship.

Moreover, even if we did not find the conduct lewd within the meaning of the nuisance abatement statute, we are persuaded that from the totality of the circumstances, an act of prostitution occurred. We primarily rely on the uncontroverted testimony of Detroit police officer Jacob Anthony who, along with his partner, witnessed Ms. Polarchio "flagging" ¹⁷ passing vehicles on Eight Mile and Sheffield. His testimony is a compelling indication that an act of prostitution occurred. As previously stated, the officers witnessed the Bennis vehicle stop in response to Ms. Polarchio's "flagging" and saw her enter the vehicle posthaste. The vehicle proceeded and within minutes again came to a stop. Ms. Polarchio's head immediately disappeared, and the officers then observed the two engaged in fellatio. The dissent fails to address this most persuasive testimony.

 

17 See n 2.

  We are additionally persuaded by the following facts which support our conclusion. One witness, Sammie Parham, a security guard at a business located at Six Mile and Woodward, testified that he had seen Mr. Bennis in the area during the summer before Bennis' October 3, 1988, arrest. Mr. Parham saw Mr. Bennis talking to a prostitute on two separate occasions and ushered the prostitutes away in both instances just as they were about to enter the Bennis vehicle.

Furthermore, it is uncontested that Ms. Polarchio had been arrested several times for solicitation and disorderly conduct. The arresting officer testified that Mr. Bennis stopped at the waving, or what he perceived to be the "flagging," by Ms. Polarchio. Additionally, we are persuaded by Mr. Bennis' admission at trial that he normally proceeds home across Eight Mile and turns north onto Woodward. It is uncontested that on the evening in question, Mr. Bennis drove down Eight Mile and proceeded south on Sheffield, the opposite direction of his home. It is also undisputed that minutes after he turned onto Sheffield and picked up Ms. Polarchio, two officers found them engaged in fellatio.

While the officers did not actually witness an exchange of money, from the testimony elicited at trial, a clear inference may be drawn that the sexual act was in exchange for monetary compensation. In his defense, Mr. Bennis has not asserted that he and Ms. Polarchio had a relationship or even knew one another, precluding any inference that the act was consensual, rather than for hire. We do not shift the burden of proof to defendant on this issue. We clearly have sufficient testimony on the record which supports that an act of prostitution occurred. We merely find it noteworthy that, as a matter of fact, Mr. Bennis has not asserted in his defense that there was a prior or existing relationship between himself and Ms. Polarchio.

In sum, we are persuaded by the testimony of the officer witnessing the act and the stated additional facts that augment our decision. Under these circumstances, proof of an actual exchange of money is not required. An action will not be denied merely because the witnessing officers do not allow the illicit activity to proceed to the point where money is exchanged. We therefore conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that an act of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution occurred in the Bennis vehicle.

III

As noted above, MCL 600.3801; MSA 27A.3801 provides for the abatement of a vehicle used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution. However, the statute does not define the extent of activity required to constitute a nuisance. Therefore, we must next determine whether anact of prostitution committed in a neighborhood known for illicit activity is within the purview of the statute.

A

Although the issue has not been resolved by appellate decisions of this state, an attempt was made to clarify the definition of nuisance in Motorama Motel, supra. Citing People ex rel Wayne Prosecuting Attorney v Bitonti, 306 Mich 115; 10 N.W.2d 329 (1943), Motorama held that "[a] nuisance involves the notion of repeated or continuing conduct and should not be based upon proof of a single isolated incident unless the facts surrounding that incident permit the reasonable inference that the prohibited conduct was habitual in nature." Id. at 229-230. However, Motorama'sreliance on Bitonti is belied by the fact that only four of the eight justices in Bitonti held that a single act was sufficient to constitute an abatable nuisance. ¹⁸

 

18 Four justices held that a single act was sufficient, three held it was not, and one concurred in the reversal of the abatement but "without expressing the opinion that proof of a single violation would be insufficient to establish the existence of a nuisance under all circumstances." Id. at 120.

As a result, existing Michigan precedent does not specifically require more than a single incident of conduct. However, cognizant of the activity that has implicitly constituted a nuisance in previous actions, ¹⁹ we must determine whether the activity in this case properly falls within the definition of nuisance as used in MCL 600.3801; MSA 27A.3801.

 

19 We acknowledge that many abatement cases in this state based on identical predecessor statutes involved a nuisance where more than a single act of conduct was proved or could be inferred. People ex rel Wayne Prosecuting Attorney v Sill, 310 Mich 570, 572; 17 N.W.2d 756 (1945), abated the interest of a vehicle where proof was submitted that the owner was engaged in the "numbers racket" and had in his possession a number of betting slips. State ex rel Wayne Prosecuting Attorney v Martin, 314 Mich 317, 322; 22 N.W.2d 381 (1946), held that "the testimony of defendant would of itself be a sufficient basis for the court's finding that defendant had used the automobile in question on the very day of his arrest and the preceding day for the illegal purposes [gambling] claimed by plaintiff" and therefore was abatable pursuant to the nuisance abatement statute. Levenburg, supra at 466-467, upheld the abatement of a Detroit bar where there was testimony that prostitutes frequently solicited customers to perform sexual acts elsewhere. In State ex rel Macomb Co Prosecuting Attorney v Mesk, 123 Mich. App. 111, 123; 333 N.W.2d 184 (1983), the Court relied on Motorama, requiring that the prosecution establish that the nuisance was continuing in nature. A continuing nuisance was established where four undercover police officers made separate visits to a massage parlor over a nine-month period and each time a model agreed to perform sexual services.

  B

Because the public nuisance statute allows the abatement of property used in a proscribed manner without specifying the activity that will constitute a nuisance, we are aided in the definition of a nuisance by general public nuisance law. This Court has defined a public nuisance as involving "not only a defect, but threatening or impending danger to the public . . . ." Kilts v Kent Co Bd of Supervisors, 162 Mich 646, 651; 127 NW 821 (1910). Similarly, this Court has declared a public nuisance where an act "offends public decency." Bloss v Paris Twp, 380 Mich 466, 470; 157 N.W.2d 260 (1968). ²⁰ Finally, Garfield Twp v Young, 348 Mich 337, 342; 82 N.W.2d 876 (1957), held that to constitute a nuisance

 

   the activity must be harmful to the public health, or create an interference in the use of a way of travel, or affect public morals, or prevent the public from the peaceful use of their land and the public streets. [Citations omitted.]

 

 

The rationale is that a nuisance involves a continuing detrimental effect on the public. The nuisance abatement statute serves the same general purpose. Therefore, mindful of the activity that generally constitutes a public nuisance, we apply these principles to the context of the nuisance abatement statute.

 

20 In Bloss, supra, this Court upheld the lower court's injunction of the operation of an outdoor theater showing explicit movies where neighborhood children could view the films from outside the drive-in. Id. at 468-469. The Court held: "It is our judgment that the foisting off of a display of pictures not fit for children to see onto places within their view on public streets, on residential properties and in private homes, without the consent of the property owners and the parents, is a public nuisance." Id. at 470.

C

In construing the nuisance abatement statute, "effect must be given, if possible, to every word, sentence and section." Grand Rapids v Crocker, 219 Mich 178, 182; 189 NW 221 (1922). Moreover, to discover the legislative intent, "the entire act must be read, and the interpretation to be given to a particular word in one section arrived at after due consideration of every other section so as to produce, if possible, a harmonious and consistent enactment as a whole." Id. at 182-183. However,

 

   where the language of a statute is of doubtful meaning, a court must look to the object of the statute in light of the harm it is designed to remedy, and strive to apply a reasonable construction that will best accomplish the Legislature's purpose. [Marquis v Hartford Accident & Indemnity, 444 Mich 638, 644; 513 N.W.2d 799 (1994) (citations omitted).]

 

 

Pursuant to these rules of construction, we consider MCL 600.3815; MSA 27A.3815 in our analysis of whether an abatable nuisance exists. The section provides:

 

   In any action brought under this chapter, evidence of the general reputation of the building, vehicle, boat, aircraft or place is admissible for the purpose of proving the existence of the nuisance. [Emphasis added.]

 

 

The nuisance abatement statute's use of the disjunctive "or" allows us to consider the reputation of the vehicle or the place to determine whether a nuisance exists. The Random House College Dictionary defines "place" as "an open space, or square, in a city or town," "a short street, court," and "an area of habitation, as a city, town, or village." Given the unique facts in this case, we focus on the word "place" set forth in MCL 600.3815(1); MSA 27A.3815(1). We conclude that the word "place" may encompass a neighborhood, and we therefore consider the general reputation of the area surrounding the Eight Mile and Sheffield intersection for purposes of determining the existence of a nuisance. ²¹

 

21 See State ex rel Wayne Co Prosecuting Attorney v Bernstein, 57 Mich. App. 204, 206; 226 N.W.2d 56 (1974), upholding the abatement of a bar under MCL 600.3801; MSA 27A.3801 where "officers testified to numerous arrests for accosting and soliciting, and to the general reputation of the Vernor Bar as a place where the services of a prostitute can easily be obtained." See also People v Lee, 307 Mich 743, 753; 12 N.W.2d 418 (1943), upholding admission of testimony of three witnesses about the "general reputation in the vicinity" of a house of prostitution in an action to convict the owner of the house.

  Several members of that n