OPINION

In this case, we are asked to decide whether a store building which was allegedly used to facilitate the sale of a controlled substance may be forfeited pursuant to MCL 333.7521(1)(f); MSA 14.15(7521)(1)(f). Drawing upon the plain language and legislative history of § 7521(1)(f) as well as the public policy of the controlled substances act, MCL 333.7101 et seq.; MSA 14.15(7101) et seq., we hold that the Legislature intended to allow the forfeiture of real property under that provision. We conclude that, in the instant case, there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the claimant's store was used to facilitate the unlawful sale of narcotics. Because the claimant's store was, in our view, "substantially connected" to his cocaine business, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's order of forfeiture.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Claimant Rex Lewandowski owned and operated the Mother Lode, a precious metal and jewelry exchange store. Undercover officer Thomas Trombley entered the Mother Lode on August 8, 1985, accompanied by an informant who knew the claimant. Trombley indicated that he wanted to buy one-half ounce of cocaine. However, the claimant stated that he would not handle a transaction involving less than two ounces. The parties then agreed to a sale for that amount, and Trombley gave the claimant $ 2,500 as a down payment. Using the business phone, the claimant made several attempts to contact his supplier. When his efforts failed, the claimant returned the money to Trombley. The claimant instructed Trombley to contact him the next day to see if he had communicated with his source.

Trombley met the claimant at the Mother Lode the following morning. They went for a ride in claimant's new BMW automobile. During the drive, the claimant advised Trombley that he would not be able to reach his source until later that afternoon. At approximately 2:00 p.m., Trombley returned to the store and drove the claimant to a particular phone booth from which the supplier was contacted.

The claimant advised Trombley that he could obtain the cocaine for $ 4,000 and that immediate payment was necessary. The claimant offered Trombley a Mother Lode business receipt in return for the $ 4,000. However, Trombley refused to tender the cash up-front. Instead, the two agreed to meet later that evening at a shopping mall.

At the mall, the claimant told Trombley that the cocaine was under the front seat of the BMW. As instructed, the detective placed $ 4,000 in the glove compartment and retrieved a package containing cocaine.

On August 14, 1985, Trombley called the claimant at the Mother Lode. The claimant returned his call and arranged to deliver additional cocaine. When Trombley met the claimant at the store later that day, the claimant retrieved eight ounces of cocaine from the BMW and gave it to Trombley in a back room. In exchange, Trombley gave the claimant $ 15,000. The claimant placed the money in a desk drawer behind the front counter in the display room.

Shortly after the exchange took place, the claimant was arrested and charged with delivering over 50 grams but less than 225 grams of cocaine. MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(iii); MSA 14.15(7403)(2)(a)(iii). The claimant's business was searched. On August 15, 1985, the prosecutor, pursuant toMCL 333.7522; MSA 14.15(7522), filed the present civil forfeiture action in rem in Macomb Circuit Court, seeking the confiscation of $ 5,264 found in a drawer behind the store counter, the BMW automobile registered to the claimant, the building and business inventory of the Mother Lode, and the real property upon which the building stood. Only the building and the real property are at issue in this appeal. Deeds indicated that the claimant was the sole owner of the building and real estate.

On February 14, 1986, the claimant was convicted of the charged offense. A forfeiture hearing was held on May 22, 1986. ¹ The trial court ordered the forfeiture of the claimant's building on May 23, 1985, stating that MCL 333.7521(1)(f); MSA 14.15(7521)(1)(f) clearly permits the forfeiture of "any thing of value [including real estate] which is used . . . for the purpose of facilitating [the sale of a controlled substance]." In the opinion of the trial court, the prosecutor presented an overwhelming amount of evidence to support the forfeiture of the claimant's store. "We have testimony, uncontradicted, [that] the actual buy took place in a back room of the Mother Lode, that's in the store itself . . . [and that] an offer was made to sell another . . . large quantity of cocaine as Detective Trombley was preparing to leave the store."

1 At the hearing, Trombley and another undercover officer testified with regard to the events described above. Adrian Lewandowski, claimant's brother, testified for the defense. He claimed that the money found in the drawer behind the store counter was his. Adrian explained that he had acted as an agent for his brother's company by purchasing precious metals and jewelry. When the business was short on cash, Adrian would provide the needed liquidity. According to Adrian, the store did not have a separate cash drawer. Adrian claimed that the $ 5,264 was found in his own personal drawer and that he was, therefore, entitled to its return.

The trial court, finding Adrian to be an incredible witness, rejected his claim to the money and ordered the forfeiture of all of the above categories of property.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order of forfeiture. ² Relying upon In re Forfeiture of 2850 Ewing Road, 161 Mich App 266; 409 NW2d 800 (1987), lv den 429 Mich 884 (1987), the Court held that "[real] property which is merely the situs of a violation of the controlled substances act is not subject to forfeiture." ³ On June 22, 1988, we granted leave to appeal, limited to the issue whether the store building was subject to forfeiture under MCL 333.7521; MSA 14.15(7521). ⁴

2 In re Forfeiture of $ 5,264, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided December 1, 1987 (Docket No. 93247).

3 The Court of Appeals addressed each category of property separately. As to the $ 5,264, the Court held that only $ 400 was forfeitable because only four marked $ 100 notes were specifically traceable to the sale of cocaine. Second, the Court found that there was little dispute about the forfeitability of the BMW since it had been involved in each of the cocaine transactions. Third, the Court held that the business inventory was forfeitable because claimant's cocaine business was tightly interwoven with the legitimate business. According to the Court, "[while] business records indicate that claimant was operating a gold and jewelry exchange, the people proved by a preponderance of the evidence that sales of the inventory were used to conceal controlled substance transactions."

4 430 Mich 891 (1988).

II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The issue before the Court is one of statutory construction. Our primary goal in interpreting MCL 333.7521; MSA 14.15(7521) is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature in enacting the statute. If the language of a statute is unambiguous, the intent must be determined accordingly, and no judicial interpretation is warranted. City of Livonia v Dep't of Social Services, 423 Mich 466, 487; 378 NW2d 402 (1985); Dussia v Monroe Co Employees Retirement System, 386 Mich 244, 249; 191 NW2d 307 (1971); Melia v Employment Security Comm, 346 Mich 544, 562; 78 NW2d 273 (1956). However, where statutory language is of doubtful meaning, a court must look to the object of the statute, the harm which it is designed to remedy, and apply a reasonable construction which best accomplishes the statute's purpose. State Treasurer v Wilson, 423 Mich 138, 144; 377 NW2d 703 (1985); Lakehead Pipe Line Co v Dehn, 340 Mich 25, 35; 64 NW2d 903 (1954).

MCL 333.7521; MSA 14.15(7521) provides:

(1) The following property is subject to forfeiture:

* * *

(f) Any thing of value that is furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance or an imitation controlled substance in violation of this article, traceable to an exchange for a controlled substance or an imitation controlled substance in violation of this article, or used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this article including but not limited to money, negotiable instruments, or securities. To the extent of the interest of an owner, a thing of value is not subject to forfeiture under this subdivision by reason of any act or omission that is established by the owner of the item to have been committed or omitted without the owner's knowledge or consent. Any money that is found in close proximity [sic] to any property that is subject to forfeiture under subdivision (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) shall be presumed to be subject to forfeiture under this subdivision. This presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. [Emphasis added.]

At issue is the proper construction of the phrase "any thing of value that is . . . used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this article including but not limited to money, negotiable instruments, or securities." Section 7521(1)(f) does not expressly specify real property as "any thing of value" used to facilitate a violation of the controlled substances act. Thus, because the statute is ambiguous on its face, we must determine and give effect to the intention of the Legislature.

A

A thorough examination of the express language of § 7521(1)(f) evidences the Legislature's intent to permit the forfeiture of real property. When drafting the forfeiture provision, the Legislature used the term "any" to describe "thing of value." Webster defines the adjective "any" to mean "every." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1985), p 93. The term "thing" is defined as an "object[] . . . of property as contradistinguished from 'person.'" Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed), p 1326. In light of these common-sense definitions, real property would seem to qualify as "any thing of value."

In Gibson v Agricultural Life Ins Co, 282 Mich 282, 289; 276 NW 450 (1937), a case involving the interpretation of the word "any" in a contract of insurance, we affirmed the trial court's finding that "[the] clause uses the word 'any,' which to the ordinary understanding implies 'of every kind.' The word negatives the idea of exclusion and would seem to mean just what it says. The plaintiff insists [incorrectly] the word 'any' as used in this contract means less than all." Like the plaintiff in Gibson, the claimant in the instant case contends that "any" in § 7521(1)(f) means less than "every" and that real property is somehow excluded from the phrase "any thing of value" used to facilitate a violation of the controlled substances act.

As in Gibson, we decline to adopt such an illogical construction. The phrase "any thing of value," in our view, is all-inclusive, encompassing both real and personal property. Nowhere does § 7521(1)(f) exclude real property from its coverage. In fact, an inspection of MCL 333.7523; MSA 14.15(7523) and MCL 333.7524; MSA 14.15(7524), the provisions immediately following § 7521 in the controlled substances act, reveals that the Legislature undoubtedly contemplated the forfeiture of real property under § 7521(1)(f). In § 7523(3), the Legislature expressly stated that a court of competent jurisdiction shall determine who has "[title] to real property forfeited under [the controlled substances act]." ⁵ Moreover, in § 7524(2), the Legislature articulated the various methods through which an appointed receiver may dispose of real property forfeited under article 7 of the act. ⁶ Because of the Legislature's express directives regarding real property in §§ 7523(3) and 7524(2), and in light of the well-known rule of statutory construction that each provision of an act is to be read with reference to every other provision so as to produce an harmonious whole, Detroit v Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 408 Mich 410, 481; 294 NW2d 68 (1980); Ram Broadcasting of Michigan, Inc v Public Service Comm, 113 Mich App 79, 88; 317 NW2d 295 (1982); see 2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 46.05, p 90, we conclude that real property is subject to forfeiture under § 7521(1)(f). Unless the Legislature had contemplated the forfeiture of real property in some manner pursuant to § 7521(1)(f), both § 7523(3) and § 7524(2) would be superfluous.

5 Section 7523(3) provides:

Title to real property forfeited under this article shall be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. A forfeiture of real property encumbered by a bona fide security interest is subject to the interest of the secured party who neither had knowledge of nor consented to the act or omission. [Emphasis added.]

6 Section 7524(2) provides:

In the course of selling real property pursuant to subsection (1)(b), the court that has entered an order of forfeiture may, on motion of the agency to whom the property has been forfeited, appoint a receiver to dispose of the real property forfeited. The receiver shall be entitled to reasonable compensation. The receiver shall have authority to do all of the following:

(a) List the forfeited real property for sale.

(b) Make whatever arrangements are necessary for the maintenance and preservation of the forfeited real property.

(c) Accept offers to purchase the forfeited real property.

(d) Execute instruments transferring title to the forfeited real property. [Emphasis added.]

The claimant, relying upon Ewing Road, contends that real property is subject to forfeiture under § 7521(1)(f) only when it is "furnished in exchange for a controlled substance" or "traceable to an exchange for a controlled substance." In Ewing Road, the Court of Appeals refused to permit the forfeiture of a private residence from which the owner had engaged in the regular sale of marijuana. Id. at 268. The Court opined that a thing of value which is used to facilitate a violation of the controlled substances act does not include real property because of the proviso "including but not limited to money, negotiable instruments, or securities:"

We conclude that the proviso . . . relates only to that portion of subsection (f) which provides that any thing of value is subject to forfeiture which is "used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this article." We so conclude because of the lack of a comma between the word "article" and the proviso. [Id. at 272.]

According to the Court, had the Legislature not intended to restrict the type of property subject to forfeiture, it would have simply ended the sentence after the word "article," rather than inserting a limiting proviso. Because real property is "radically different in kind" from the illustrative list provided by the Legislature, ⁷ the Court concluded that the claimant's home may not be forfeited under subsection (f). Id. at 272.

7 The Court of Appeals evidently applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis. The literal translation of the expression is "[of] the same kind, class, or nature." Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed), p 464:

In the construction of laws, wills, and other instruments, the "ejusdem generis rule" is, that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. The rule, however, does not necessarily require that the general provision be limited in its scope to the identical things specifically named. Nor does it apply when the context manifests a contrary intention. [Citations omitted.]

In our view, the rule of ejusdem generis does not apply in the instant case. We find no evidence suggesting that items forfeited under § 7521(1)(f) must be identical or even comparable to "money, negotiable instruments, or securities." In fact, we can only find evidence suggesting that things forfeited under the statute need not be similar to "money, negotiable instruments, or securities." First, the statute begins with the phrase "any thing of value" which, to us, implies an intention to be as expansive as possible. Second, in the proviso itself, the Legislature employed the words "including but not limited to money, negotiable instruments, or securities," which, in our opinion, further suggests that a broad construction was intended. Third, upon the basis of the express language of §§ 7523(3) and 7524(2), it is quite clear that the Legislature intended to permit the forfeiture of real property under § 7521(1)(f). Accordingly, we conclude that the doctrine of ejusdem generis should not be applied in this case.

We reject this strained construction of § 7521(1)(f). ⁸ In our view, the sentence at issue in this case should be read as a whole rather than in the disjointed manner urged by the Court in Ewing Road and the claimant in the instant case. The Ewing Road Court based its interpretation of § 7521(1)(f) on the lack of a comma. Relying so heavily upon the absence of a punctuation mark, in our view, exalts form over substance. Although the form and location of a proviso may be some indication of legislative intent, form alone will not control. No presumption regarding the scope of its application arises from the location of the proviso. Kelley v Recorder's Court Judge, 239 Mich 204, 212; 214 NW 316 (1927); E F MacDonald Co v Dep't of Treasury, 62 Mich App 626, 632; 233 NW2d 678 (1975); see 2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 47.09, p 138.

8 A recent panel of the Court of Appeals has also rejected this interpretation of § 7521(1)(f). In re Forfeiture of 45649 Maben Road, 173 Mich App 764; 434 NW2d 238 (1988).

In our view, the proviso was placed in § 7521(1)(f) to modify "any thing of value." The claimant contends that the proviso only precludes the forfeiture of real property under the last clause of the statute which permits the forfeiture of any thing of value "used to facilitate" a violation of the controlled substances act. Thus, according to the claimant, because real property which is "furnished for" or "traceable to" a controlled substance may still be forfeited under § 7521(1)(f), §§ 7523(3) and 7524(2) are not rendered nugatory.

We find no evidence that the Legislature intended to change its intent in midsentence. On the contrary, we can only find evidence suggesting that the proviso was intended to apply to all three clauses. According to fundamental rules of grammar, a present participial phrase, like "including, but not limited to money, negotiable instruments, or securities," ⁹ is used as an adjective and, therefore, must modify a noun. ¹⁰ The only noun used as a subject in § 7521(1)(f) is "thing." Hence, in our view, the proviso modifies "any thing of value" that is furnished for a controlled substance,traceable to a controlled substance, or used to facilitate a violation of the act.

9 Shaw, Errors in English and Ways to Correct Them (New York: Harper & Row, 3d ed, 1986), pp 227-229:

A participle is a verbal adjective, a word having the function of both verb and adjective. As a verb form, it can take an object and be affected in meaning by an adverb. As an adjective, it can modify a noun or pronoun and can itself be modified by an adverb. [Id., p 227. Emphasis added.]

A participle may be in the present (singing, asking), past (sung, asked) or perfect (having sung or having been sung, having asked or having been asked) tense. Id. A participial phrase takes its name from the initial word in the phrase. Id., p 229.

From these basic rules of grammar, we infer that the proviso "including but not limited to" is a present participial phrase derived from the verb "include." The phrase as used in the first sentence of § 7521(1)(f) is an adjective modifying the noun "thing."

10 Shaw, Errors In English, n 9 supra, p 227. "An adjective modifies (affects the meaning of) a noun or pronoun."

Contrary to the interpretation of the Court of Appeals in Ewing Road, we do not view the proviso, "including but not limited to," to be one of limitation. Rather, we believe the phrase connotes an illustrative listing, one purposefully capable of enlargement. Skillman v Abruzzo, 352 Mich 29, 33-34; 88 NW2d 420 (1958); People v Clark-Van Brunt, 158 Cal App 3d Supp 8; 205 Cal Rep 144, 149 (1984); Lenoir City v State ex rel City of Loudon, 571 SW2d 297, 299 (Tenn, 1978). Furthermore, in light of the Legislature's express directives in §§ 7523(3) and 7524(2), we are persuaded that the forfeiture of real property was envisioned in the statutory scheme and intended to be included in the phrase "any thing of value." ¹¹

11 As stated previously, § 7524(2) specifically addresses the sale of real property "pursuant to subsection (1)(b)." Subsection (1)(b) then refers back to § 7521(1)(f) as follows: "The proceeds and any money, negotiable instruments, securities, or any other thing of value as described in section 7521(1)(f) that are forfeited pursuant to this article shall be applied . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Although real property is not expressly included in subsection (1)(b), we conclude, upon the basis of an harmonious reading of §§ 7521(1)(f), 7523(3), and 7524(2), that the Legislature intended to include real property in the term "any thing of value."

  B

Our examination of the legislative history of § 7521 also indicates the Legislature's intent to permit the forfeiture of real property when it has been used to facilitate a violation of the controlled substances act.

Before amending § 7521(1)(f) in 1982, the Legislature recognized an apparent obstacle in the state's war on drugs:

Four years ago, the U. S. Congress amended the federal Uniform Controlled Substances Act to permit the civil forfeiture of property of virtually any kind, including money, when the property could be directly linked to illegal drug transactions. As a result of that amendment, federal agents in fiscal year 1980-1981 were responsible for the forfeiture of over five million dollars in assets from Michigan drug busts in which local law enforcement agencies often played a major role. These assets benefitted the federal treasury, but had Michigan's laws contained similar forfeiture provisions those funds could have been retained by state and local law enforcement agencies for use in the state in the fight against drug trafficking. However, state officials have no authority under current state law to forfeit assets related to drug violations using the civil law's lower standard of proof. The federal Drug Enforcement Administration has made available a model law for states to use in making their laws parallel to the federal act. . . . [The] legislature ought to act to adopt some form of that model law so that law enforcement agencies and substance abuse programs in the state could make use of forfeited assets that otherwise would go to the federal government. [House Legislative Analysis, SB 645, September 21, 1982.]

Addressing this loophole in state law, the Legislature drafted the current version of § 7521(1)(f). The statute was purposefully patterned after the federal forfeiture act, 21 USC 881(a)(6), which provides in part that "[all] moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value" may be subject to forfeiture. ¹² Our Legislature chose to reverse the listing of the property subject to forfeiture to read "any thing of value . . . including, but not limited to money, negotiable instruments, or securities." In our view, the Legislature made this language change in order to provide a more expansive definition of the phrase, "any thing of value."

12 21 USC 881(a)(6) specifically provides:

   (a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them:

* * *

(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter, except that no property s